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State Sovereigntym-A Polished
But Slippery Crown
Kenneth F. Ripple* and Douglas W. Kenyon**
During the past decade, the Supreme Court has decided two notable cases'
which have had, it is certain, the effect of greatly enhancing both the theoretical
and the practical significance of the tenth2 and eleventh3 amendment-based concept of "state sovereignty." As a consequence, there has been an acceptance, at
least in the "conventional wisdom," 4 of the proposition that the star of "state
sovereignty"-long dulled since Mr. Justice Stone's famous remark in United
States v. Darby-is now on a steadily ascending course at the hands of a Court
clearly concerned about restoring a sense of balance in "Our Federalism." 6
Analysis-and prognostication-in the development of constitutional doctrine
are, however, never that comfortable. As Justice Frankfurter wrote, in an essay'
originally written before his ascendancy to the Supreme Bench8 and revised after
over a decade as a sitting Justice, "[a] rhythm, even though not reducible to law,
is manifest in the history of Supreme Court adjudication. Manifold and largely
undiscerned factors determine general tendencies at the Court, much too simpli* Associate Professor of Law and Director, Thomas J. and Alberta White Center for
Law, Government and Human Rights, School of Law, University of Notre Dame. A.B., Fordham University; J.D., University of Virginia; LL.M., The George Washington University.
**
Candidate for the Juris Doctor degree at the Notre Dame Law School, May, 1979;
B.A., 1976, University of Notre Dame.
The authors express their special appreciation to Dr. Donald P. Kommers and James B.
Ginty, Esquire, for their invaluable criticisms and suggestions in the preparation of this article.
1 National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1973).
The majority opinion in Edelman was written by Justice Rehnquist. He was joined by the
Chief Justice and Justices Stewart, White and Powell. Dissenting opinions were filed by Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall. Justice Blackmun joined the opinion of Justice Marshall.
Justice Rehnquist also wrote for the majority in National League of Cities and was joined
by the Chief Justice and Justices Stewart, Blackmun and Powell. Two dissenting opinions were
filed-one by Justice Brennan, in which Justices White and Marshall joined-the other by
Justice Stevens.
2 "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST.
amend. X.
3 "The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
4 See J. GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 9 (1958).
5 "The [tenth] amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered" United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
Darby itself did not, of course, directly present a situation where the commerce power had
been used to directly affect "integral state functions" as that term is used in National League
of Cities. Rather, it involved a limitation on the police power of the state. Darby did, however, dull the vitality of the tenth amendment in all respects including its ability to identify
the states as distinct governmental entities in our federal system, i.e., as "sovereigns." See Fry
v. United States, 421 U.S. 547, n.7 (1975).
6 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
7 Frankfurter, The Supreme Court reprinted in, P. KURLAND, FELIX FRANKFURTER ON
THE SUPREME COURT: EXTRA JUDICIAL ESSAY ON THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION

448

(1970). The original version was published in 1934 in the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences.
The latter version was prepared for publication in the Hansard Society's Aspects of American
Government (1950).
8 Mr. Justice Frankfurter took his seat in January, 1939.
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flied by phrases like 'the centralization' of Marshall or 'the states rights' of
Taney."' Moreover, it is a basic trait of American constitutional development
that any shift in ideological perspective-and especially a cross-doctrinal shiftcarries within it the seeds of its own limitations. Indeed, these modern cases,"0
manifesting a concern with the position of the state government within the federal system, began their jurisprudential lives with a particular susceptibility to
such limitation. Forged on the barest of majorities, they were subject, from the
beginning, to the strongest of dissent."
The purpose of this article is not to announce the end of this rejuvenation
of state sovereignty in our federal structure. 2 Rather, in the pages which follow,
we shall attempt to isolate, from the recent work of the Court, what appear to be
significant indications-some of them seminal-that the trajectory of the star
of "state sovereignty" will soon encounter as many centripetal as centrifugal
forces and that the resultant doctrinal orbit may be a little less spectacular than
the "conventional wisdom" had predicted.
I.
As a predicate to this analytical survey, it is appropriate to set forth, at
least briefly,'3 two key cases which are the cornerstones for the present Court's
renewed interest in the concept of state sovereignty-National League of Cities v.
Usery and Edelman v. Jordan.
Prior to NationalLeague of Cities, the Supreme Court of the United States
had decided, over the past four decades, a series of cases which, when read
together, seemed to establish that the tenth amendment was no barrier to congressional exercise of the Commerce Power. In United States v. California,4
a unanimous Court ruled that provisions of the Safety Appliance Act' 5 forbidding
interstate rail carriers to haul cars not equipped with automatic impact couplers
applied, with equal force, to state-owned railroads.'
Maryland v. Wirtz,"
9 See Frankfurter, supra note 7, at 454.
10 See note 1 supra.
11 Both Edelman and National League of Cities were decided on 5-4 votes. For a more
complete explanation of the Court's "lineup" see note 1 supra.
12 This article will focus on the relationship between state government and federal power.
It does not assume, of course, that the matrix of federal-state relations is entirely dependent on
issues of state governmental sovereignty. See, e.g., Elkins v. Moreno, 435 U.S. 647 (1978);
Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). Nor will the question of interstate relations
be addressed. See, e.g., Nevada v. Hall, 47 U.S.L.W. 4261 (1979); Baldwin v. Fish and Game
Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371 (1978); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 435 U.S. 902 (1978).
13 For more complete treatments of Edelman and National League of Cities, see, e.g.,
Barber, National League of Cities v. Usery: New Meaning for the Tenth Amendment, 1976
SUPREME COURT REviEw 161; The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REv. 43, 243
(1974).

14

297 U.S. 175 (1936).

15 Safety Appliance Act of 1893 § 2, 45 U.S.C. § 2 (1893).
16 The Court curtly rejected California's assertion that statehood itself served to bar the
operation of the Safety Appliance Act. Distinguishing the scope of limitations imposed on the
exercise of the federal taxing power from those limitations attendant to the exercise of the
Commerce Clause, the Court stated:
Hence we look to the activities in which the states have traditionally engaged as
marking the boundary of the restriction upon the federal taxing power; But there is
no such limitation upon the plenary power to regulate commerce. The state can no
more deny the power if its exercise has been authorized by Congress than can an
individual.
297 U.S. at 185.

17

392 U.S. 183 (1968).

[V9ol. 54: 745]

STATE SOVEREIGNTY

decided some thirty years after United States v. California,8 rejected the state's
contention that principles of state sovereignty could be interposed affirmatively
to prevent the otherwise valid exercise of the Commerce Power and consequently
upheld amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act that applied directly to
state schools and hospitals.19 Fry v. United States2" validated provisions of the
Economic Stabilization Act of 197021 which imposed wage and salary controls
on state employees. In each of these cases, remedial federal legislation was
sustained under the Commerce Clause, although the challenged statutory provision directly displaced the states qua states within the federal system.
In 1974, however, Congress enacted amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act which, for the first time, applied the minimum wage and maximum
hour provision of the Act directly to state and municipal government employees.

"The Act . . . [imposed] upon almost all public employment the

minimum wage and maximum hour requirements previously restricted to employees [actively] engaged in interstate commerce," 23 thereby subjecting the states
24
to requirements "essentially identical to those imposed upon private employers.
Under the new amendments certain vitally important public employment areas,
such as police and fire protection services, were brought within the bounds of
federal regulation" and, therefore, compensation for overtime pay would be
payable in cash rather than with. compensatory time off.
Faced with threatened application of these amendments, the National
League of Cities, together with individual municipal and state governments, filed
for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging, inter alia, that the 1974 amend18 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
19 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, § 102, 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(d) (5) (4) (1966).
In 1961 Congress expanded the FLSA to bring certain "enterprises" engaged in commerce
within the purview of its provisions. The amendment was crucial since it effectively eliminated the direct connection requirements for applicability of the Act. As a consequence,
employees of an enterprise engaged in commerce are protected. The Court relied on United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1
(1937) to sustain the validity of this "enterprise concept." See 392 U.S. at 188-93. Then,
turning to the states' contention that the exercise of such power constituted an impermissible
"interference with 'sovereign state functions'" it concluded: (1) that the "governmental" versus
"proprietary" distinction between state activity was immaterial to the proper resolution of a
Commerce Clause case; (2) that the principle of United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175
(1936), was controlling and (3) that, therefore, the Court would "not carve up the commerce power to protect enterprises indistinguishable in their effect on commerce from private
businesses, simply because those enterprises happen to be run by the states for the benefit of
their citizens." See 392 U.S. at 198-99.
20 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
21 Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, § 202, 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (Supp. 1970). The Fry
Court reiterated the principle set forth in Wirtz "that states are not immune from all federal
regulaions under the Commerce Clause merely because of their sovereign status." See 421 U.S.
at 548. It then noted that the Act (1) was limited in application; (2) was an emergency
measure promulgated in response to a specific national need and (3) depended, for its effectiveness, on uniform application. In rejecting petitioners' tenth amendment claims, however, Justice
Marshall made it clear that the "truism" of Darby was, nevertheless, significant. "The [tenth]
amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power
in a fashion that impairs the state's integrity or ability to function effectively in a federal
system." See 421 U.S. at 547.
22 Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6, 88 Stat. 55, 58
(amending 29 U.S.C. § 203 (1970)).
23 426 U.S. at 839.
24 Id.
25 National League of Cities v. Brennan, 406 F. Supp. 826, 827 (D.C., 1974).
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ments to the FLSA were beyond the power of Congress under the Commerce
Clause because, as applied, they would "seriously affect the structuring of state
and municipal governmental activities." 2 Instead, the National League urged
recognition of an affirmative limitation on the exercise of the Commerce Power
which operated when Congress sought "to regulate directly the activities of States
as public employers. .".."" The complaint alleged inter alia, that, if the amendments were permitted to stand, voluntary community service programs would be
placed in immediate jeopardy, and the ability of the affected governmental unit
to meet particular exigencies would be vitiated by the forced imposition of work
structures inappropriate for a governmental employees' workweek. 8 The district
court, "troubled by the contention that the amendments would intrude upon the
states' performance of essential governmental functions"29 but constrained by
Maryland v. Wirtz,"° dismissed the complaint while simultaneously sending the
Supreme Court the following signal:
it may well be that the Supreme Court will feel it appropriate to draw back
from the far-reaching implications of Maryland v. Wirtz; but that is a
decision that only the Supreme Court can make, and as a federal district
court we feel obliged to apply the Wirtz opinion as it stands.2 1
The Supreme Court did indeed feel it appropriate to "draw back from the
far-reaching implications of Maryland v. Wirtz,"'3 holding, in National League
of Cities v. Usery," "that insofar as the challenged amendments operate to
directly displace the states' freedom to structure integral governmental functions,
they are not within the authority granted by Art. I, § 8, Cl. 3.' ,34 Justice Blackmun concurred in the Court's opinion in National League of Cities only after
making it clear that he remained troubled by certain possible implications of the
decision itself.2 ' The Justice characterized the majority opinion as adopting a
balancing approach to tenth amendment analysis. Hence, no automatic displacement of federal power would follow a finding that the exercise of such
power reached into areas of traditional state governmental functions. Rather,
the importance of the conflicting local interest would be weighed against the
asserted federal concern. Justice Blackmun suggested, for example, that federal
power to regulate in the interest of environmental protection would not be
affected by the limitations of the tenth amendment because a demonstrably
greater federal interest would justify the imposition of federal environmental
standards directly against the states.
National League of Cities was not, however, a unanimous decision. Dependent on the concurring opinion of Justice Blackmun for its strength, it also
faced a strong dissent which recognized only a single course of limitation on fed26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

Id.
427 U.S. at 841.
Plaintiff's Complaint at 20-21, National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1974).
426 U.S. at 839.
392 U.S. 183 (1968).
406 F. Supp. at 828.
392 U.S. 183 (1968).
426 U.S. 833 (1976).
426 U.S. at 852.
Id. at 856.
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eral commercial power-the ballot. While the majority had found within the
tenth amendment an express declaration of limits "upon the authority of Congress to regulate the activities of the states as states by means of the commercial
power,"36 the dissenting members of the Court decried what they considered to
be an unprincipled break with past decisions establishing "that the Constitution
contemplates that restraints upon exercise by Congress of its plenary commerce
power lie in the political process and not in the judicial process." 7
3
Edelman v. Jordan
is the other recent case generally considered to be at
the heart of the Court's ideological shift toward state autonomy. The factual
basis of the decision is quite simple. The State of Illinois, under the auspices of
the Illinois Department of Public Aid, voluntarily chose to participate in a
federal-state cooperative categorical assistance program commonly known as
Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled (AABD)." Under applicable regulations,
the federal government guaranteed matching funds and established administrative procedures to govern application, entitlement and disbursement processes.
These regulations applied to states choosing to participate in the program." In
1968, Illinois officials began administering the program under state regulations
materially different from those promulgated by the federal government. In
particular, federally imposed time limitations governing the application and disbursement process were ignored and benefit payments were curtailed or delayed.
Recipients claiming entitlement under the AABD program brought an action
for declaratory and injunctive relief in the federal district court. They alleged:
first, that the state regulations were inconsistent with superior federal law and
therefore invalid under art. VI of the U.S. Constitution and, second, that the
unequal application of the regulations effectively denied them equal protection of the laws. The district court granted prospective relief against continued
application of the Illinois regulations. It also required that state officials release,
retroactively, AABD benefits withheld from those whose applications had not
been processed in accordance with federal law." The Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed in Jordan v. Weaver.42
The question, presented to the Supreme Court in the Fall of 1973, was
whether the eleventh amendment operated as a bar to the award of retroactive
benefits payable out of the state treasury." The Court's decision reversed the
affirmance of that portion of the district court's order granting retroactive
monetary relief. Citing with approval portions of Judge McGowan's opinion in
Rothstein v. Wyman,44 the Court stated:
It is not pretended that these payments are to come from the personal resources of the appellants. Appellees expressly contemplate that they will,
36 Id. at 842.
37 Id. at 857 (Brennan, J., dissenting, and citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 21 U.S. (9 Wheat.),
197 (1824)).
38 415 U.S. 651 (1973).
39 Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1385 (1970).
40 45 C.F.R. § 206.10 (1973).
41 Jordan v. Swank, No. 71 0 70 (D. Ill. 1972).
42 472 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1973).
43 415 U.S. at 658-59.
44 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972).
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rather, involve substantial expenditures from the public funds of the
state.. . .It is one thing to tell the Commissioner of Social Services that he
must comply with the federal standards for the future if the State is to have
the benefit of federal funds in the programs he administers. It is quite
another thing to order the Commissioner to use state funds to make reparation for the past. The latter would appear to us to fall afoul of the Eleventh
Amendment if that basic constitutional provision is to be conceived of as
having any present force. 467 F.2d at 236-237.45
In reaching its conclusion that retroactive payments "fall afoul of the eleventh
amendment," 4 the Court focused on the nature of the relief requested and, concluding that the prayer for "equitable restitution" was essentially a suit for
"damages against the state, invoked the immunity doctrine to preclude recovery."4 7 While Edelman strengthened the relative position of the state vis-4-vis
the exercise of federal judicial authority, it did so with barely a majority vote.
In this respect, Justice Brennan's dissent, which completely rejected application
of "the nonconstitutional but ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity,"4 8 stands
in telling polarity to the opinion of the Court. Unlike Mr. Justice Rehnquist,
who, writing for the majority, found in the history of the eleventh amendment a
rationale for reversing the court below, Justice Brennan remained convinced that
the immunity doctrine could not be applied to bar the exercise of an enumerated
power specifically granted Congress by the states in the Constitution.4 9
II.
To what degree do these cases represent a major long-term shift in the
Court's overall perspective of the role of state governments in our federal system?
In pursuing this inquiry, two approaches immediately suggest themselves. First,
to what degree has the Court extended these doctrinal holdings when given the
opportunity to do so? Secondly, to what degree have the controlling policy considerations in these cases markedly influenced cases in other areas?
This article will proceed with these inquiries in the following manner: First,
it will examine the consideration given to the Commerce Power-tenth amendment analysis in cases decided subsequent to National League of Cities. Next,
since it might be expected that the tremors of any long-term enhancement of
the role of state governments as a result of National League of Cities would be felt
in doctrinally distinct yet ideologically analogous situations, it will examine
whether that decision appears to have had any effect on the Court's treatment of
either the Spending Power Clause or on federal-state relations in the taxation
45 415 U.S. at 665.
46 Id.
Id. at 668.
Id. at 687.
He wrote:
I remain of the opinion that "because of its surrender [of sovereign rights at the
formation of the Union] no immunity exists that can be the subject of a congressional declaration or a voluntary waiver" . . . and thus have no occasion to inquire
... whether or not Illinois voluntarily waived the immunity by its continued participation in the program against the background of precedents which sustained judgments
ordering retroactive payments.
415 U.S. at 688.
47
48
49
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area. Then, the article will shift in perspective to the Court's post-Edelman consideration of eleventh amendment problems. Here, the path is somewhat better
worn-at least at the beginning. Finally, from this cross-doctrinal examination
of the ebb and flow of the recent cases, this article will suggest the significance of
these cases in terms of a long-term prognosis for the concept of "state sovereignty"
at the hands of the present Supreme Court.
A. Subsequent Commerce Power-Tenth
Amendment Confrontations
There has been no definitive attempt by the Court in subsequent Commerce Power cases to delineate the boundaries of its analysis in National League
of Cities. Not too long after its decision in that case, the Court was confronted
with what appeared to be a particularly good opportunity to clarify its new
doctrinal stance. Under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970,50 the states
were required to submit to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection
Agency a state plan for the implementation and enforcement of national ambient
air quality standards." When several states failed to submit a plan acceptable
to the Administrator, he promulgated his own transportation control plan for
each state. In general terms, these plans required the states to develop certain
regulatory procedures aimed at controlling emissions from motor vehicles. While
specifics varied from state to state, the federally promulgated plans generally
required the development of a motor vehicle inspection and maintenance
program, various retrofit programs for older vehicles, the designation and enforcement of preferential bus and carpool lanes, and, of course, the monitoring
of actual emissions from each program. 2 If the states failed to implement such
programs, the Administrator could not only enforce his plan53 but also subject the
state to direct enforcement actions.5 4 The affected states challenged these regulations, as inter alia, violative of the tenth amendment. Various courts of appeals,
while striking down the plans on statutory grounds, simultaneously noted that
serious constitutional questions might be raised if the statute was read to permit
such federally imposed plans.55
50 Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970)).
51 Clean Air Amendments of 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 110, 84 Stat. 1680 (amending
42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970)).
52 Environmental Protection Agency v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99, 101 (1977).
53 42 U.S.C. § 1857 c-8(a) (2) (1970).
54 42 U.S.C. § 1857 c-8(a) (1) reads:
Whenever, on the basis of any information available to him, the Administrator finds
that any person is in violation of any requirement of an applicable implementation
plan, the Administrator shall notify the person in violation of the plan and the
tate in which the plan applies of such finding. If such violation extends beyond the
30th day after the date of the Administrator's notification, the Administrator may
issue an order requiring such person to comply with the requirements of such plan or
he may bring a civil action. in accordance with subsection (b) of this section.
55 Environmental Protection Agency v. Brown, 521 F.2d 825, 827 (9th Cir. 1975); Environmental Protection Agency v. Maryland, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975). In Virginia ex rel.
State Air Pollution Control Board v. Castle, Administrator Environmental Protection Agency v.
District of Columbia, 521 F.2d 971 (DC Cir. 1975) the court took a different approach.
It held that the Clean Air Act authorized the Administrator to require the state to enforce the
federal regulations. It went on to conclude, however, that such authority could not constitutionally be extended to require state inspection of private vehicles.
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Before the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General maintained that National
League of Cities was not controlling since the Administrator's regulations did not
"threaten the separate and independent existence of the State." 6 They did not,
he argued, place substantial costs on the state or "displace a wide range of state
decisions about how traditional state functions will be performed.""7 Indeed, he
submitted, the regulations are "narrowly drawn to affect only one area of state
activity-its transportation policy-and only that part of the activity that
specifically creates the pollution problem." 8 For good measure, he added that
the pollution problem was a "national emergency"" 9 such as that confronted in
0
Fry v. United States,"
a holding explicitly reaffirmed in National League of
6
Cities.
In a five-page postargument per curiam opinion,62 issued five months after
oral argument,"' the Court returned the cases to the courts of appeal for a
consideration of mootness. Seizing principally on a footnote in the Solicitor General's brief that conceded the necessity of "removing from the regulations all
requirements that the states submit legally adopted regulations,"64 the Court
56 Brief for the Federal Petitioners at 18, Environmental Protection Agency v. Brown, 431
U.S. 99 (1977).
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 426 U.S. at 853. Justice Rehnquist accepted the Fry Court's characterization of the
situation there presented as "an emergency measure to counter severe inflation that threatened
the national economy." 421 U.S. at 548. He then continued:
We think our holding today quite consistent with Fry. The enactment at issue
there was occasioned by an extremely serious problem which endangered the well-being
of all the component parts of our federal system and which only collective action by
the National Government might forestall. The means selected were carefully drafted
so as not to interfere with the States' freedom beyond a very limited, specific period
of time. The effect of the across-the-board freeze authorized by that Act, moreover,
displaced no state choices as to how governmental operations should be structured,
nor did it force the States to remake such choices themselves. Instead, it merely
required that the wage scales and employment relationships which the States themselves had chosen be maintained during the period of the emergency. Finally, the
Economic Stabilization Act operated to reduce the pressures upon state budgets rather
than increase them. These factors distinguish the statute in Fry from the provisions
at issue here. The limits imposed upon the commerce power when Congress seeks to
apply it to the States are not so inflexible as to preclude temporary enactment
tailored to combat a national emergency. "[A]lthough an emergency may not call into
life a power which has never lived, nevertheless emergency may afford a reason for
the exertion of a living power already enjoyed." Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332, 348
(1917).
61 426 U.S. at 853.
62 431 U.S. 99 (1977).
63 Oral argument was held on January 12, 1977; the opinion was rendered on May 2, 1977.
64 Brief for the Federal Petitioner at 20 n.14, Environmental Protection Agency v. Brown,
431 U.S. 99 (1977). The entire note reads as follows:
The Administrator has never asserted any power to compel the State to carry out
its governmental responsibilities under an implementation plan by, for example, monitoring ambient air quality and enforcing the emission controls applicable to private
stationary sources. Nor does he contend that he can direct the State to adopt laws
or regulations creating transportation control plans that comply with the Act (see
Pat. No. 1055, App. 2 7a-39a; Pat. No. 75-909, p. 17, n. 15). He thus concedes the
necessity of removing from the regulations all requirements that the States submit
legally adopted regulations; the regulations contain no requirement that the State
adopt laws. If the State fails to adopt an adequate plan, the Administrator must
promulgate a comprehensive substitute plan, specifying such matters as the types of
vehicles to be inspected, the standards that must be met, and the frequency of inspection. The State must then implement the program by establishing the necessary
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declined "the federal parties' invitation to pass upon the EPA regulations, when
the only ones before us are admitted to be in need of certain essential modifications."" Justice Stevens, dissenting in a short but vigorous opinion, remarked
that the "action the Court takes today is just as puzzling as the federal parties'
position.""6
It is indeed difficult, as Justice Stevens suggests, to see how the narrow
admission of the federal petitioners did in fact make the case technically moot
rather than simply inappropriate for Supreme Court review." The plain fact is
that the Court flatly declined this "particularly good opportunity to clarify its
new doctrinal stance.""8 The significance of this action is a more difficult question. It would be pure conjecture to conclude from the Court's rather inexplicable behavior that its action constitutes a rejection of Justice Blackmun's
view that the analytical pattern of National League of Cities is essentially a
"balancing approach [,] and does not outlaw federal power in areas such as
environmental protection, where the federal interest is demonstrably
greater ..
."" The only definitive conclusion that can be supported by the
Court's action is that its disposition did not manifest any headlong rush to
enhance the autonomy of the states. 70
Another Commerce Power case, City of Lafayette, Louisiana V. Louisiana
Power and Light Co.,71 while deciding in a technical sense only a matter of statutory construction, provides more significant insight into future constitutional
directions for the concept of "state sovereignty." Here, the Court was asked to
determine whether the prohibitions of the federal antitrust laws 2 were applicable
to state municipalities. It had been contended in this litigation that the City of
Lafayette, in the sale of electricity outside its boundaries, had engaged in certain
monopolistic practices which had injured competing producers of power in their
inspection facilities, conducting the inspections, refusing to register nonconforming

vehicles, and enforcing its registration laws.
65 431 U.S. at 103.
66 Id. at 104.
67 Cf. Cook v. Hudson, 429 U.S. 165 (1976) (writ dismissed where intervening decision
of Supreme Court of the United States and intervening state statute made clear that question
would not arise again in that state); Picirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548 (1970) (writ dismissed where intervening New York decision established that no controversy any longer existed
between parties with respect to the question upon which certiorari had been granted) ; Rice v.
Sioux City Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70 (1955) (writ dismissed where intervening Iowa statute would
prevent question from arising again in that state). But see Iowa Beef Packers, Inc. v. Thompson, 405 U.S. 228, 232 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See generally, Blumenstein. The
Supreme Court's jurisdiction- Reform Proposals,DiscretionaryReview, and Writ of Dismissals,
26 VAND. L. REv. 895 (1973).
68 See text following note 35 supra.
69 426 U.S. at 855.
70 In Beame v. Friends of the Earth, 434 U.S. 902 (1977), the Court denied certiorari
in another case involving a transportation control plan. It would be especially inappropriate to
infer any significance in terms of a long-term jurisprudential trend from this action. The court
of appeals gave two alternative rationales for its holding: it first reasoned that the applicants
were precluded by section 307(b) (2) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857 h-5(B) (2)
from making their constitutional attack on the plan as a defense to a civil enforcement proceeding. Second, the court of appeals held that the tenth amendment was no bar to the plan
since, unlike the situations in E.P.A. v. Brown the state had promulgated its own plan. Friends
of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1977). See also 434 U.S. at 1310 (Marshall, J., in
chambers).
71 435 U.S. 398 (1978).
72 The Sherman Anti-Trust Act and the Clayton Act are codified beginning at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1970).
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business or property. 3 In a long, rather unstructured plurality opinion, 4
Justice Brennan found, in effect, that the rationale of Parker v. Brown 5 ought not
to apply ex proprio vigore to antitrust claims against state municipalities. Reading Parker v. Brown7 ' and more recent explanations of its holding in Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar7 and Bates v. State Bar of Arizona7 ' as limiting the exemption
to "official action directed by [the] State,'7 9 the Justice concluded that it would
be inconsistent with that limitation to extend the exempion to state municipalities.8" "Cities," he asserted, "are not themselves sovereign; they do not receive
'
all the federal deference of the states that create them."81
It is only when a
municipal corporation, acting as an instrumentality of the state for the convenient administration of government, acts as a state agency pursuant to state
policy "to the same extent as the State itself"'8 2 that Parker v. Brown83 is applicable.
Significantly, Justice Brennan basically grounded this characterization of
municipalities on eleventh amendment precedent which held that cities were
not protected by that provision from suit in federal court.84 Since, under his
formula, cities were exempted from the scope of the antitrust laws "when acting
as state agencies implementing state policy to the same extent as the state
itself,"" s National League of Cities was not, in his view, "even tangentially implicated."8 " By contrast, the dissent of Justice Stewart,87 while clearly considering
the case a matter of statutory construction, made it clear that "if constitutional
analogies are to be looked to, a decision much more directly related to the case
than those under the eleventh amendment is National League of Cities ...""
-not only because it also involved an exercise of the Commerce Power but also
because it held "that states and their subdivisions must be given equal defer73 This action was originally brought by the City of Lafayette and other cities. They
alleged that the respondent, among others, had committed certain antitrust violations. Respondent counterclaimed, alleging antitrust violations on the part of the City. The district court
dismissed the counterclaim on the ground that the "state action doctrine" of Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341 (1943), forbade the maintenance of a federal antitrust action against the City.
See Saenz v. University Interscholastic League, 487 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1973). The court of
appeals reversed, holding that Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) required
a showing that the authority given the city by the legislature contemplated the type of anticompetitive action forming the basis of the complaint. 532 F.2d at 434-35.
74 Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Marshall, Powell, and Stevens. The Chief Justice joined Part I of the opinion, making that section an opinion of the Court. Justice Powell
had joined the majority in National League of Cities.
75 317 U.S. 391 (1943). In this case, the Court held that an anticompetitive marketing
program for the 1940 California raisin crop, adopted pursuant to the California Agricultural
Prorate Act, did not violate the antitrust laws.
76 Id.
77 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
78 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
79 435 U.S. at 412.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 412.
83 See note 75 supra.
84 See, e.g., Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890). The Court recently ruled
that an interstate compact "comparable to a county or municipality" does not enjoy eleventh
amendment immunity.
85 435 U.S. at 412.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 426.
88 Id. at 430.
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ence."" To Justice Stewart and the three other members of the Court90 who
joined his opinion, municipalities are only " 'instrumentalities of the state for the
convenient administration of government within their limits.' "s' They "have
only such powers as are delegated them by the state of which they are a subdivision, and when they act they exercise the state's sovereign power."9 In the
view of these Justices, therefore, the plurality's holding that municipalities did
not share completely in the sovereignty of the state government would precipitate
for state governments many of the difficulties which were at the heart of the
Court's rationale in National League of Cities. Most notably, in the view of the
dissenters, the plurality's emphasis on the necessity of state legislative action and
the vagueness of how precise a legislative mandate will be required would have
the net effect of diminishing the extent to which states would allocate power to
its governmental subdivisions. States would no longer be free to structure their
internal organization to permit municipalities "to deal quickly and flexibly with
local problems"93 while the state legislature devotes more time to statewide
matters.9 4
What do the writings in this case contribute to the long-term prognosis of
the concept of "state sovereignty" in our jurisprudence? The two principal
opinions present-in doctrinal and in ideological terms-a rigid standoff. The
plurality opinion, similar to the opinion Justice Brennan delivered in Massachusetts v. United States,95 on the same day,99 can easily' be read as an effort to
erode the doctrinal underpinnings of National League of Cities. Under this view,
unless the municipality can show that its actions have met the still ambiguous
test of being "pursuant to state policy," the tenth amendment restrictions on the
extent of the Commerce Power outlined in National League of Cities are not
even implicated. On the other hand, the dissenters, while admittedly focusing on
the statutory interpretation question, show no predilection toward the moderate
approach of balancing the interests of federal policy and of state governments
which Justice Blackmun suggested in his concurring opinion in National League
of Cities.97 On the contrary, Justice Stewart emphasizes the right of the state to
retain full flexibility not only in its structuring of its subdivisions but also in its
choice of regulatory options.
The separate opinion of the Chief Justice,9" whose vote was necessary to
permit the Brennan plurality to prevail, is also instructive in terms of long-term
doctrinal and ideological prognosis. To him, the present case was determined
by the fact that the City of Lafayette was " 'engaging in what was clearly a busi89 Id. (citing 426 U.S. at 844 n.20).
90 Justice Stewart was joined by Justices White, Blackmun (except for Part II B), and
Rehnquist.
91 435 U.S. at 429 (quoting Louisiana v. Mayor of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285, 287

(1883)).

92
Breard
93
94
95
96
97
98

Id. (citing with approval Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 480 (1968)
v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 640 (1951)).
435 U.S. at 435.
See especially section II A of Justice Stewart's opinion. 435 U.S. at 434.
435 U.S. 444 (1978). See text accompanying note 165 infra.
March 29, 1978.
426 U.S. at 880.
435 U.S. at 418.
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ness activity' " 59-a situation clearly beyond the exemption of Parkerv. Brown...
and, he adds, clearly beyond the scope of the prohibition on federal Commerce
Power in National League of Cities. Significantly, then, he seems to see a governmental-proprietary distinction as one of the controlling, if unarticulated, bases
of the NationalLeague of Cities opinion.10' Moreover, even if it were established
that the city's "governmental" action was the result of "a state policy to displace
competition with regulation or monopoly public service,"'0 2 the Chief Justice
would go a step further and require a showing that the exemption from federal
law "was necessary in order to make the regulatory Act work, and even then
only to the minimum extent necessary."'0° This test-borrowed from Cantor
v. Detroit Edison"'--seems compatible with the "balancing approach of Mr.
Justice Blackmun in National League of Cities and certainly does not demonstrate the same preoccupation with the structural autonomy of the states and
municipalities as manifested by the dissenters.
In sum, Commerce Power-tenth amendment cases subsequent to National League of Cities provide little indication of future doctrinal or ideological
trends. From the little available evidence, there appears to be no workable
majority of the Court capable of defining, with any degree of precision, the relationship between these two competing constitutional considerations. The root
of the difficulty appears to be the Court's reluctance-or inability-to grapple
with a definition of "integral governmental functions"'0 s beyond the one offered
in National League of Cities itself." 6 Indeed, there is significant ambiguity concerning the appropriate methodology to be employed in defining that term. The
"balancing approach" of Justice Blackmun in National League of Cities'
acknowledges that federal power ought not act upon the states in the same
manner as it does on private individuals. It also seems to accept the proposition
that it would be setting "the tenth amendment on its head ... [to require] that
state power, or at any rate a part of it, be defined prior to the definition of national power .. .""0 However, the major difficulty with this definitional approach is that it invites-indeed requires-ad hoc assessments with little in the
way of external criteria to guide the judgment. 9 There is some evidence that
the more structurally disposed members"0 of the National League of Cities
majority would prefer a historical approach to the task of defining "integral

99 Id.
100 See note 75 supra.
101 435 U.S. at 423-24.
102 435 U.S. at 425 (citing the plurality opinion 435 U.S. at 413).
103 435 U.S. at 426 (quoting Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 597 (1976)).
104 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
105 426 U.S. at 851.
106 They were defined as "[t]hose activities . . .performed by state and local governments in
discharging their dual functions of administering the public law and furnishing public services."
426 U.S. at 851 (footnote omitted).
107 426 U.S. at 856.
108 E. CORWIN, THE COMMERCE POWER V. STATES RIGHTS 125-26 (1936) (emphasis in the
original).

109 426 U.S. at 851.
110 As indicated previously (see text accompanying notes 103, 104 supra), the opinion
the Chief Justice in City of Lafayette indicates he may now favor a "balancing approach."

[Vol. 54:745]

STATE SOVEREIGNTY

government functions." 1 1' However, unless Flagg Brothers, Inc. et al. v. Brooks..
is relevant (which appears highly unlikely), the Court has yet to provide any
guidance from this perspective either.
Having found little hard evidence of the Court's future attitude toward
"state sovereignty" in cases involving the same doctrinal analysis as National
League of Cities, the next logical step is to explore those areas where, while there
was no possibility of a direct doctrinal impact from that case, measurable ideological "fallout" might be expected, if, in fact, we are witnessing a major shift in
the Court's regard for the sovereignty of the states.
B. Restrictions on FederalGrants to States
In National League of Cities, Mr. Justice Rehnquist noted, quite pointedly,
that the Court was not, in that case, confronted with a claim that the tenth amendment was an affirmative restriction on congressional use of its Spending Power." 3
The Court was, therefore, well aware of the possible ramifications of its decision
into that long-controversial but judicially inactive area. Moreover, given the
widespread increase in "strings attached" grants in recent years, the Court's
realization that its holding had implications for that area is not surprising. Since
United States v. Butler,"4 the tenth amendment has been considered at least a
theoretical barrier to federal regulation of activity not otherwise within Congress'
enumerated powers. Of course, a tremendous portion of Butler's strength has
been dissipated by subsequent holdings such as Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis".
and Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commission."' It is now generally
accepted that the federal government may condition a grant of federal funds to a
state upon compliance with certain requirements "-especially when those conditions are designed to assure the proper use of those funds".8 or where the state
is a willing partner in the arrangement." 9 However, if under National League of
Cities, the federal Commerce Power may not intrude into the area of "integral
governmental functions"' 2 9 of the state, ought a similar prohibition ever govern
attempts by the Congress to condition monetary grants on stipulations which
operate directly upon the structure or functions of state government itself?
During its 1977 Term, the Court was presented with an opportunity to
expand the rationale of National League of Cities to a situation where Congress
had conditioned the receipt of federal funds, under the National Health Planning
111 The Court emphasized that "integral governmental functions" included those services
traditionally provided by state governments. See, e.g., 426 U.S. at 851 n.16; id. at 855.
112 436 U.S. 149 (1978). This case dealt with the "state action" requirement of fourteenth
amendment analysis and held that a private party does not act for the state unless it performs
what has traditionally been an "exclusive public function" (emphasis added). There is no indication that the Court contemplates making the state action concept in this area interchangeable with a definition of "integral government functions."
113 426 U.S. at 852 n.17.
114 297 U.S. 1 (1936).

115 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
116 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
117 See, e.g., Vermont v. Brinegan, 379 F.Supp. 606 (D.Vt. 1974), where highway funds
were withheld for noncompliance with Highway Beautification Act.
118 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
119 Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
120 426 U.S. at 851.
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and Resources Development Act
of 1974,121 upon the state's establishment of a
"certificate of need program."' 2 Such a program would be designed to limit
new institutional health delivery systems in the state to "only those services,
facilities, and organizations found to be needed... .""' Under a decision of the
Supreme Court of North Carolina,1 4 establishment of the program would have
been, in the words of that Court, "in excess of the constitutional power of the
Legislature."''
The state argued, therefore, that as a price for participating
with the other states of the Union in over forty federal assistance program in the
health care field, it was being compelled, by the federal government, to amend
its state constitution. This "gun-at-the-head" approach to ensuring federal
standards of uniformity, argued the state, violated, inter alia,"' the tenth amendment. The thrust of the complaint was narrowly drawn. The state made no
general challenge to the validity of federal health appropriations under the General Welfare Clause. More importantly, there was no broad-based attack on the
general power of the federal government to impose terms and conditions upon
its fiscal grants to the states. Rather, the state contended: first-that the conditions imposed may not be unrelated to the legitimate purposes of federal health
legislation; second-that those conditions may not invade the sovereign rights of
the states." 7 The weakness of the state's case on the first contention not only
brought about a rather summary rejection of that submission by the district
court but also affected substantially the vitality of the second. Essentially, the
district court noted that the federal legislation had, as one of its basic purposes,
the more efficient and economical use of health services through correction of the
"maldistribution of health care facilities and manpower.""' 8 Given this statutory
purpose, concluded the court:
Congress in making grants for health care to the States, should be vitally
concerned with the efficient use of the funds it appropriates for that purpose.
It had a perfect right to see that such funds did not cause unnecessary inflation in health costs to the individual patients. It certainly had the power
to attach to its grants conditions designed to accomplish that end. 29
Then, distinguishing National League of Cities as a Commerce Clause case in a
footnote,"' the Court dismissed the tenth amendment argument in two sentences
by simply noting that participation in the program was not mandatory."'
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment summarily."' It is now clear,
121

National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 § 1501, 42 U.S.C.

§ 300 (1974).

122 42 U.S.C. § 300 m-2(a) (4) (B) (1974).
123 Id.
124 In re Certificate of Need for Aston Park Hospital Inc., 282 N.C. 542, 193 S.E.2d 729
(1973).
125 Id. at 193 S.E.2d at 733.

126 Other federal constitutional claims were based on the Due Process Clause of amendment
XIV and on the Guaranty Clause of article IV, section 4.

127
128
129
130
131
132

North Carolina v. California, 445 F. Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977).
Id. at 534 (citing [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7878-79.)
Id.
Id. at 536 n.10.
Id. at 536.
435 U.S. 962 (1978).
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of course, that, whatever may be their precedential significance for lower
courts,"' such summary actions do not represent-and are not considered by the
Court to be"4 -a full consideration of the issue or a full confirmation of the
reasoning of the lower court. The Court's action is this case cannot, therefore,
be read as anything more than its refusal of a single invitation to examine the
tenth amendment implications of the conditional exercise of the Spending
Power." 5 Indeed, in terms of formulating long-term constitutional doctrine, the
case was not a particularly attractive invitation. The condition imposed by the
federal statute was clearly related to the stated congressional objective of fostering a more economical and efficient delivery of health services. Moreover, the
state could have "adopt[ed] the 'simple expedient' of not yielding"" ' to the conditions imposed. The real challenge to tenth amendment limitations on the
Spending Power will probably not come until the Court considers a case where
the "nexus" between the congressional purpose and the restriction is far more
attenuated. There, the case could be characterized more effectively as the use of
the Spending Power in one area to force surrender of tenth amendment autonomy in another." 7 Even then, however, the state will be expected to respond to
the argument that it retained the option simply to decline participation in the
distribution of federal funds. In this regard, a reading of National League of
Cities-both in terms of content and "tone"-leaves the reader somewhat in
doubt as to whether the present pragmatically oriented Court would rigidly
accept Mr. Justice Cardozo's distinction between "coercion"' and "inducement"" 8 in the face of the realities of state financing and the concomitant necessity for states to recoup at least a substantial share of the federal tax contributions of its residents. On the other hand, as noted in the discussion of recent
Commerce Power-tenth amendment cases, there are some faint indications
that the Court will continue to consider any voluntary participation by the states
as a waiver of claims to autonomy of action."'
C. State Taxation
The power to tax and the ability to remain immune from taxation by other
governments have been, at least since the time of Chief Justice Marshall's opinion
in McCullough v. Maryland,4 ' key barometers for measuring the distribution of
power in our federal system. Indeed, some of the later cases in this area, defining
the scope of the tax immunity doctrines, played a significant role in Justice
Rehnquist's analysis in National League of Cities.' Therefore, any significant
133 Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1975). Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 38889 n.15 (1975).
134 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71. See also Rehnquist, Whither the Courts, 60
A.B.A.J. 787, 790 (1974).
135 But see L. TRIBE, AiMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18 (Supp. 1979) (maintaining that
this "unceremonious summary affirmance" "settled a question" left open in National League of
Cities).

136
137

330 U.S. at 143.
See 301 U.S. at 590.

138 Id. at 585-90.
139 See Beame v. Friends of the Earth, 434 U.S. 1310 (1977)
discussed in note 70 supra.
140 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
141 426 U.S. at 843-44 (see especially n.14).

(Marshall, J., in chambers)
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ideological shift in the long-range distribution of sovereign power within the federal system would probably be recorded here. During the past few terms of
Court, the Justices have decided, on plenary review, several cases which, when
read together, might easily be interpreted, at least at first glance, as establishing
a strong predilection on the part of the Court to give the states the widest possible berth with regard to their taxing power. Some of these cases involved the
interpretation of specific constitutional limitations on the states' power to tax.
Others involved the so-called intergovernmental immunity doctrine.
Two cases involving the Import-Export Clause'42 can be viewed as exhibiting a propensity, on the part of the Court, toward permitting the state the
widest latitude possible in preserving its traditional residual power to tax property within its boundaries. In Kosydar v. National Cash Register Ca.'4 the
Court was confronted with an attempt by the State of Ohio to include, on its
local property tax rolls, crated business machines awaiting foreign shipment in
NCR's Dayton warehouse. The machines were specially adapted for foreign use
and not marketable in the United States. NCR contended that the machines
were immune from state taxation on the ground that they were exports subject
Refusing to rely on the absence
to the protection of the Import-Export Clause.'
4
of any "diversion potential"' of the machines, Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for
a unanimous Court, rejected the claim of immunity "[g]iven the absence of an
entrance of the respondent's machines into the export stream."'4 6
Similarly, in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 47 the taxing authorities of
Gwinnett County, Georgia, assessed an ad valorem property tax against tires and
tubes imported by Michelin from France and Nova Scotia. At the time of the
imposition of the tax, the tires had been removed from their container and were
stacked in Michelin's warehouse awaiting sale and delivery to franchised dealers.
Overruling Low v. Austin,'48 the Court held that a nondiscriminatory ad
valorem property tax was not within the prohibition of the Import-Export
Clause.'49
At least one significant development in the more relevant area of intergovernmental tax immunities could also be interpreted, at first glance, as indicating a propensity on the part of the present Court to favor the capacity of the
states to exercise their taxing authority. In United States v. Fresno,' the Court
was faced with the application of a California nondiscriminatory annual use or
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Impost or Duties on
Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing the inspection laws: and the net Produce of All Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all
such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Control of the Congress.
U.S. CONST. art. I § 10.
143 417 U.S. 62 (1974).
144 Id. at 64.
145 Id. at 70.
146 Id. at 70-71.
147 423 U.S. 276 (1975).
148 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29 (1872). Relying on Brown v. Maryland 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)
419 (1827), the Court had held that "[w]hilst retaining their character as imports, a tax upon
them, in any shape, is within the constitutional prohibition." 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 39.
149 423 U.S. at 302.
150 429 U.S. 452 (1977).
142
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property tax on the "possessory interest"' 51 of federal employees in housing owned
and supplied to them by the federal government as part of their compensation.
After rehearsing the oscillating precedents since McCullough,'52 Mr. Justice
White, relying on the so-called "Detroit Trilogy,"' 15 3 held that "a state may, in
effect, raise revenues on the basis of property owned by the United States so long
as it is being used by a private citizen or corporation and so long as it is the possession or use by the private citizen that is being taxed.' 54
Close analysis of the foregoing cases reveals, however, a far more principled
basis for the Court's holdings than a simple predilection in favor of broad state
taxing power. While the brief Kosydar opinion provides little evidence of the
policy considerations underlying the Court's rationale, Michelin is based on a
detailed and explicit analysis of the purpose of the Import-Export Clause and
employs, against that background, a "functional analysis" of the impact of the
ad valorem tax.'
As Mr. Justice Blackmun recently pointed out in Department
of Revenue of Washington v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Companies,5 ' the most recent Import-Export Clause case, Michelin determined the
applicability of the import-export prohibition by analyzing whether the state tax
in question offended "any of the three policy considerations leading to the
presence of the Clause. . . ." ' The Court found that the tax offended none of
these policies since: 1) "[i]t did not usurp the federal government's authority
to regulate foreign relations since it did not 'fall on the goods because of their
place of origin' ";
2) it did not deprive the federal government of any
revenues to which it might be otherwise entitled but simply compensated the
states for municipal services rendered; 3) it would not "disturb harmony among
the states because the coastal jurisdictions would receive compensation only for
services and protection extended to imports."'5 5 A close analysis of the Fresno
case also reveals a similar "functional" methodology. The Court there concluded
that the principle of intergovernmental immunity is simply aimed at protecting
the "target sovereign's"'6 0 ability to function free from control, in the form of
obstruction or burden, of the other sovereign. The tax at issue in Fresno placed
the legal incidence of the tax on the individual. The economic burden, if in
fact passed on to the federal government, merely removed "an advantage otherwise enjoyed by the federal government in the employment market."'' Accordingly, no "federal function"'0 2 was impaired by the operation of the tax. This
conclusion, which holds that the Court is now applying a principled, functional
analysis when defining the limitations on state taxation power rather than merely
following an ideological propensity for increased state power, is to some extent
151 Id. at 456.
152 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
153 City of Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489 (1958); United States v. City of Detroit,
355 U.S. 466 (1958); United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484 (1958).
154 429 U.S. at 462.
155 423 U.S. at 290-94.
156 435 U.S. 734 (1978).
157 Id. at 752.
158 Id. at 753 (citing 423 U.S. at 286).
159 Id.
160 I.e., the sovereign subjected to the burden of the tax.

161

429 U.S. at 464.

162

Id.
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validated by the Court's decision in United States v. Mississippi Tax Commission.'
There, the Court struck down a state tax on liquor sold to military
installations since, under the terms of the state statute, the legal incidence fell on
an instrumentality of the federal government-a commissioned officers' open
mess."' Consistent with the foregoing analysis, the "federal function" was impaired since, as a matter of state law, it was forced to bear the financial burden
imposed by the state.
Massachusetts v. United States"" presents, among the tax immunity cases,
a special opportunity for a long-term prognostication of the constitutional significance of "state sovereignty." In 1970 Congress enacted the Airport and
Airway Development Act of 197016 and the Airport and Airway Revenue Act
of 19707 which, "together constitute a comprehensive program ... [designed to]
... substantially... expand and improve the national airport and airway system
over the decade ..
.""'8 According to the scheme, "federal outlays that benefited the civil users of the airways would, to a substantial extent, be financed by
taxing measures imposed on those civil users."' 6 9 One of the revenue provisions
adopted was an annual registration tax which imposes a "flat fee" tax on all
civil aircraft which use the navigable airspace over the United States."" Since no
exemption was provided for aircraft owned by state governments, the federal
government proceeded to assess a tax on a Massachusetts state police helicopter
which was owned by the Commonwealth and used exclusively for state police
functions. After the federal government levied on a bank account of Massachusetts to collect the tax, plus interest and penalties, the state brought suit for a
refund. The district court. 7 ' and the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 72
upheld the tax. The Supreme Court affirmed.
In terms of result, this case is, of course, quite compatible with the decisional
trend already perceived in the earlier tax immunity cases. Neither sovereign will
be deprived of a traditional revenue source absent a showing that the imposition
of the revenue measure would in fact impair the functions of the other sovereign.
On several other levels of analysis, however, the positions expressed in the opinions raise serious and interesting questions concerning the Court's future treatment of state governmental entities. The principal opinion was written by Mr.
163 421 U.S. 599 (1975). To the extent that the Commerce Clause can be considered to
create "by its own force . . . an area of trade free from interference by the States" and thereby
to serve as "a limitation upon the power of the States," Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252
(1946), the Court's recent decision in Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977)
also may be considered a "validation of the conclusion. that the 'Court is employing a 'functional' approach in limiting statc taxation power." There, the Court upheld a Mississippi tax
"on the privilege of doing business" as applied to interstate commerce since it found it to be
fairly apportioned, nondiscriminatory against interstate commerce, and fairly related to the
services provided by the state. 430 U.S. at 279.
164 421 U.S. at 610.
165 435 U.S. 444 (1978). This case was decided the same day as City of Lafayette, Louisiana v. Louisiana Power and Light Co. See note 96 supra.
166 29 U.S.C. §§ 1711-1715, 1717 (1970).
167 Airport and Airway Revenue Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-258, 84 Stat. 236 (codified in
scattered sections, 26, 49, U.S.C.).
168 435 U.S. at 447.
169 Id.
170 Airport and Airway Revenue Act of 1970 § 206, 26 U.S.C. § 4491 (Supp. II 1972).
171 The opinion of the district court is unpublished.
172 548 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1977).
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Justice Brennan. It would have been a rather straightforward task to decide the
case on the ground that the tax amounted simply to a user fee. Indeed, the Court
of Appeals had decided the issue on this narrow ground.'
The Solicitor General, arguing in support of the tax, similarly relied upon this characterization.'
The dissenting Justices7 3 indicated that, if the record were adequately developed,
they would be willing to sustain the tax on that basis. 7 ' Justice Brennan, however, rejected this direct route and filed an opinion which is a classic example of
judicial guerrilla warfare over constitutional doctrine.
First, writing for a plurality of four Justices-notably the four who joined
him in his National League of Cities dissent 7-the Justice launched into a fullscale but, in terms of what would have been necessary to decide the matter on a
user fee rationale, gratuitous exposition of the theoretical basis of the tax immunity doctrines. From the beginning of the opinion, it is quite apparent that
this circuitous route was chosen to achieve an important conceptual limitation on
National League of Cities. The Justice began by stressing the different bases for
federal immunity from state taxation and for state immunity from federal taxation.'
While the former is clearly based on the Supremacy Clause, the latter,
he noted, "was judicially implied from state's role in the constitutional
scheme,"' 79 in order to ensure the autonomy of the "traditional state functions"' 0
of the states. Lest the latter phrase be given an expansive meaning, the Justice
added that
immunity for the protection of state sovereignty is at the expense of the
sovereign power of the National Government to tax. Therefore, when the
scope of the States' constitutional immunity is enlarged beyond that necessary to protect the continued ability of the States to deliver traditional governmental services, the burden of the immunity is thrown upon the National Government without
any corresponding promotion of the constitu8
tionally protected values.' '
Relying on Chief Justice Marshall's famous dictum in McCullough v. Maryland, 8' he justifies this narrow scope of the states' constitutional immunity on
the ground that federal tax policy is the product of the national Congress which,
in turn, is composed of state constituencies-"an inherent check against the
possibility of abusive taxing of the states by the National Government."' 3 By
footnote, he quickly asserts that, while National League of Cities "rejects the
argument that the operation of the political process eliminates any reason for
reviewing federalism-based challenges to federal regulation of the states qua
173 Id. at 34.
174 Brief of the United States at 6-7, Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978).

175

Justice Rehnquist dissented, and he was joined by the Chief Justice.

176 435 U.S. at 472 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
177 Justices White, Marshall, and Stevens joined all of Justice Brennan's opinion, Justices
Stewart and Powell joined parts Iand III.

178
179
180
181
182
183

435 U.S. at 453-60.
Id. at 455.
Id.
Id. at 456.

"The power of taxing... may be exercised so as to destroy" 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 427.
435 U.S. at 456 (footnotes omitted).
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states . .. ""' the existence of "political checks'"8 5 is relevant to a determination
of the proper scope of a state's immunity from taxation.
This conceptual "fencing in" of the National League of Cities rationale
might be simply viewed as the rear-guard action of the losing side in National
League of Cities' if the theme were not carried over to that part of the opinion
which was joined by two Justices-Potter Stewart and Lewis Powell-who had
voted with the National League of Cities majority. After establishing that a
user fee is a permissible federal exaction against a state government, Justice
Brennan set out 8 7-- at this point with the additional concurrence of Justices
Powell and Stewart-to determine whether the particular fee exacted by § 4491
of the Airport and Airway Revenue Act" could in fact be treated as a user fee.
To aid in this determination, Justice Brennan proposed the utilization of the test
set forth in Evansville-VanderburghAirport Authority v. Delta Airlines, Inc. 9
In that case, the Court was confronted with formulating a test to determine the
validity of a local tax on individual interstate travelers on the ground that it
burdened interstate commerce. The Court upheld the validity of the tax, on the
theory that interstate commerce must "pay its way," as long as the tax: 1) does
not discriminate against interstate commerce; 2) is based on a fair approximation
of use; 3) has a reasonable relationship to the cost of the benefits conferred.'
This test, held the Brennan majority in Massachusetts, also sets forth valid criteria
for determining the constitutional permissibility of a revenue measure imposed by
the federal government on a state government. "State function" may simply be
substituted "for interstate commerce in that test."'191 In short, the constitutional
appropriateness of a fee imposed by the federal sovereign on the state sovereign
is to be determined by examining whether the state is being treated like all
private entities upon which the tax is imposed. No focused consideration need
be given to the role of the state government within the federal system.
The practical significance of the willingness of two members of the National
League of Cities majority to join an analysis which premises federal taxing power
of state entities on a test which views state governments and private individuals
as identical becomes clear upon a quick rereading of National League of Cities.
There, Mr. Justice Rehnquist relied heavily on the immunity of the state from
federal taxation to support his theory of state sovereignty under the tenth amend184
185

186
187
188

189
190
191

Id. at 456-57 n.13.
Id.

426 U.S. 833 (1976).
435 U.S. at 463.
26 U.S.C. § 4491 provides in relevant part:
(a) Imposition of tax.
A tax is hereby imposed on the use of any taxable civil aircraft during any year at
the rate of (1) $25, plus
(2) (A) in the case of an aircraft (other than a turbine-engine-powered aircraft)
2 cents a pound for each pound of the maximum certificated takeoff weight in excess
of 2,500 pounds, or (B) in the case of any turbine engine powered aircraft, 3'/2 cents
a pound for each pound of the maximum certificated takeoff weight.
405 U.S. 707 (1972).
Id. at 717-19.
435 U.S. at 466.
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ment.' 92 If a federal tax-even a federal user fee-can be assessed against a
state without any focused inquiry into the impact of the measure on the state's
position as a sovereign in the federal system, how secure are the roots of National
League of Cities? The laconic concurring opinion of Justices Stewart and
Powell193 gives very little hint as to how much significance ought to be attached
to their joining this latter part of Justice Brennan's opinion. It may be, since the
record in this case apparently demonstrated no particular need for treating the
state differently from other users, that these two Justices viewed the test borrowed from Commerce Power analysis as simply a convenient way to express the
instant result rather than as a general decisional maxim. Such a perspective
would indicate, however, a good deal more sympathy on the part of these two
justices for Justice Blackmun's "balancing approach" interpretation of National
League of Cities than for the more "structural" approach of Justice Rehnquist.
In terms of result, recent cases dealing with state power to tax and to be immune from federal taxation do not indicate any perceptible shift in the relative
power of the federal and state sovereigns in our federal system. Doctrinally-and
attitudinally-most cases demonstrate an adherence to a traditional "functional"
analysis. In the one case where the tremors of National League of Cities have
been perceptively felt, the result is inconclusive. If that case is indicative of anything, it supports the impression left by the Commerce Power-tenth amendment
cases after National League of Cities.'94 The Court has yet to find a principled
analytical pattern for defining those attributes of "state sovereignty" protected by
the tenth amendment. Indeed, it is not yet clear that any such definition is possible. Consequently, in its gropings, the "balancing approach"-articulated or
not-becomes a comfortable doctrinal "halfway house" if not a permanent
home for the Court.
D. Eleventh Amendment Immunity After Edelman
The cases following Edelman provide more guidance as to the scope of the
eleventh amendment than do the progeny of National League of Cities with
respect to the tenth. Hence, it is a good deal easier to predict both the future
direction of eleventh amendment jurisprudence and to estimate its overall impact
on the concept of "state sovereignty."
Two cases " 5 subsequent to Edelman-Milliken v. Bradley'96 and Hutto v.
Finney'g--fleshed out the meaning of that decision and thus forecast the future
strength of the eleventh amendment as a major contributor to the concept of
"state sovereignty." In Milliken, the defendant officials challenged an order that
required them to pay the costs of certain remedial education programs ordered
192 426 U.S. at 839.
193 435 U.S. at 470.
194 See text accompanying notes 105-12 supra.
195 A most important third case - Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) is discussed
infra. See text accompanying notes 234-44 infra.
196 433 U.S. 267 (1977). This case also dealt with the relationship of the tenth and fourteenth amendment and, in that context, is discussed infra with Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer. See text
accompanying note 248 infra.
197 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
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by the district court as part of a school desegregation plan. 198 It claimed that
payment was "in practical effect, undistinguishable from an award of money
damages against the state

. .

.""

and therefore invalid under Edelman. In re-

jecting this contention, the Supreme Court distinguished Edelman as dealing with
"accrued monetary liability.1 20 0 It upheld the relief ordered since it fitted "squarely
within the prospective compliance exception reaffirmed by Edelman"'°-an exception rooted in the rule of Ex parte Young'12 that federal courts may "enjoin
state officials to conform their conduct to requirements of federal law, notwithstanding a direct and substantial impact on the state treasury." 20 ' The relief in
Milliken, explained the Court, did not purport to grant the victims of past segregative practices immediate recompense for past injury by permitting "a raid on
the state treasury for accrued monetary liability."'0 4 Rather, "the antecedent violation"2 will continue to affect the victims "until such future time as the remedial
programs can help dissipate the continuing effects of past misconduct.' 0 6
The mere fact that the relief might be termed "compensatory,' 2 0 since it is
grounded on a past violation, does not raise the eleventh amendment bar. Since
state officials were clearly under a continuing duty to conduct a school system
free of the taint of past segregative acts, the Court could require that they expend
state funds to fulfill that obligation.
This restrictive interpretation of Edelman's scope was also clearly manifested
in Hutto v. Finney. °5 After protracted litigation over conditions in the Arkansas
prison system and noncompliance with a series or remedial orders issued to the
Arkansas Department of Corrections, the federal district court awarded opposition counsel "a fee of $20,000 to be paid out of the Department of Corrections Funds."' 0 9 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed and assessed an additional fee of $2500 in accordance with the Civil
Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976. Reviewing the validity of both
awards, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial courts award and held that the
eleventh amendment does not prevent an award of attorneys' fees to be paid out
of state funds where the award is remedial in nature and fashioned to compensate the party who won the injunction for the effects of his opponents' noncompliance.' 0 "The line between retroactive and prospective relief cannot be
198 402 F. Supp. 1096 (E.D. Mich. 1975). Basically, this plan involved remedial reading
programs, an in-service teacher training program, a testing program and counselling and career
guidance which the district court found necessary "to make desegregation work."
199 433 U.S. at 289.
200 Id. at 289 (quoting 415 U.S. at 633-44).
201 Id.
202 209 U.S. 123 (1968). The Court recently reaffirmed the holding of Young in Ray v.
Atlantic Richfield, 435 U.S. 151, 156 n.6 (1978).
203 433 U.S. at 289 (citing 415 U.S. 667).
204 433 U.S. at 290 n.22.
205 433 U.S. at 290.
206 Id.

207 Id.
208 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
209 Id. at 685.
210 Id. at 687. The Court also validated attorney's fees awarded under the Civil Rights
Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. 1988 (1976). Citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 445 (1976), the Court noted that "Congress has plenary power to set aside the State's
immunity from retroactive relief in order to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment." 437 U.S. at
693.
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so rigid that it defeats the effective enforcement of prospective relief.""21 Furthermore, noted the Court, the fees awarded by the district court were not merely
compensatory. Since their assessment was analogous to a fine imposed for civil
contempt, they also served to vindicate the Court's authority over a recalcitrant
litigant and to assure future compliance with remedial orders previously issued.
In this respect, Hutto made clear that the bar of immunity set forth in Edelman
does not prevent the assessment of costs ancillary to the effective enforcement
of a federal court order.
The nonapplicability of the eleventh amendment to suits which involve, as
a necessary by-product, "fiscal consequences to state treasuries,"2 "2 was again
addressed by several members of the Court in a most unusual context. In the
final days of October Term 1977, the Court denied, in a one-line order, a motion
of the State of California for leave to file a bill of complaint in an original
action" s against the State of Texas. 14 The alleged dispute between the two
states centered on their conflicting claims as the domicile of Howard Hughes, the
recluse millionaire, at the time of his death. In its complaint, California alleged
that, like Texas, it imposed an inheritance tax on the real and tangible personal
property located within its borders and upon the intangible personality, wherever situated, of a person domiciled within the state at the time of his death.2 "
Both states, as a matter of their respective internal laws, recognized that a person
may have only one domicile at a given time. However, according to the complaint, neither state would submit to or be bound by proceedings in the other's
courts216 and, if both state courts find that Hughes was domiciled within their
jurisdictions, the estate's total liability for federal and state taxes will exceed its
net value. 7 The complaint then went on to allege that "because there is no
other means by which the conflicting tax claims of Texas and California can be
resolved, the Supreme Court is the only forum which can determine the question
of decedent's domicile in a manner that will bind the interested parties and assure
that the state of domicile ... will be able to collect the tax."2 " Such an allegation, necessary to assure that the Court would in fact exercise its jurisdiction,219
was based not only on the nonavailability of a state forum but also on the nonavailability of an alternate federal forum. In making such an allegation, California was relying on what was, for all practical purposes, direct precedent.
2
In Texas v. Florida,
" the Court had sustained a complaint which was
identical in all material respects. In that case, the Court had characterized the
211 437 U.S. at 690.
212 415 U.S. at 633.
213 U.S. Constitution, article III, reads in pertinent part: "In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the
Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction."
214 437 U.S. 601 (1978).
215 Original Bill of Complaint at 18.
216 Id. at 25.
217 Id. at 24-25.
218 Id. at 25.
219 See Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794 (1976), Washington v. G. M. Corp., 406
U.S. 109 (1972); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Ohio v. Wyandotte
Chemicals Co., 401 U.S. 493 (1971); Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1939).
But see 425 U.S. at 798 (Stevens, J., concurring).
220 306 U.S. 398 (1939).
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2
action before it as one in the nature of an interpleader ' There was little discussion as to whether such an interpleader action could be brought in a lower federal court since, a little over a year before, the Court had squarely held in
Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley,222 that an action in interpleader seeking
resolution of conflicting adjudications of domicile was barred by the eleventh
amendment. In reaching that result, the Court, through Chief Justice Stone,
concluded that, since the suit was not aimed at restraining a state official from
unconstitutional action, 2 3 but simply at resolving of a potential conflict in the
state law decisions of two state courts, "which the Constitution does not forestall,"' 24 it was barred by the eleventh amendment.
225
In the disposition of California v. Texas, four justices took time to write
or join opinions concurring in the Court's refusal, despite the precedent of Texas
22
226
to exercise jurisdiction in this case. For three of the four -Justices
v. Florida,
Stewart, Powell and Stevens-the denial of jurisdiction could have been based
on the ground that Texas v. Floridawas wrongly decided since the alleged dispute did not, in fact, involve a ripe controversy between two states. As an alternative ground, however, each stressed, with varying degrees of forcefulness, his
belief that Edelman had so limited the scope of the eleventh amendment that it
could no longer be considered a bar against the estate's proceeding against the
two states by way of interpleader in the federal district court. Indeed, Mr.
Justice Powell wrote separately "simply to emphasize his conclusion that, in
light of Edelman v. Jordan ... Worcester County Trust C. ... . no longer can
be regarded as a bar against the use of interpleader by estates threatened with

double taxation. .

. .""s

For him, Edelman had "made it clear that the eleventh

amendment bars only suits 'by private parties seeking to impose a liability which
must be paid from public funds in the state treasury'
may have 'fiscal consequences to state treasuries . .

. .
.

. and not actions which
[that are] the necessary

result of compliance with decrees which of their very terms [are] prospective in
nature' . . at least in a case such as this, where the very controversy is a result of
'
our federal system."229
In terms of its potential for long-range enhancement of the concept of "state
sovereignty," the holding of Edelman does indeed appear to be a "paper tiger."
The Court has, in the foregoing cases and others more tangentially related to our
221 Id. at 405-12.
222 302 U.S. 292 (1937).
223 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
224 302 U.S. at 298.
225 Justices Brennan, Stewart, Powell, and Stevens.
226 306 U.S. 398 (1939).
227 For Justice Brennan, the availability of interpleader in the district court after Edelman
was apparently the sole ground for his joining the Court's judgment.
228 437 U.S. at 615 (Powell, J., concurring).
This interpretation of the eleventh amendment is consistent with the doubts concerning
Worcester Trust expressed by Professor Zechariah Chaffee, Jr., in his seminal article on the
federal interpleader statute: "It is our federal system which creates the possibility of double
taxation. Somewhere within that federal system we should be able to find remedies for the
frictions which that system creates. . . . The Interpleader Act of 1936 provided machinery
which could have given a remedy for interstate disputes over domicile. Hence, it is disappointing that the Supreme Court felt unable to overcome the obstacles to its use." Chaffee,
FederalInterpleaderSince the Act of 1936, 49 YALE L. J. 377, 388 (1940).
229 437 U.S. at 616 (quoting 415 U.S. at 633, 667-68) (Powell, J., concurring).
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focus on the place of state government in the federal system, consistently retained
it within to what the Chief Justice referred to in Milliken v. Bradley2 s ° as "traditional eleventh amendment principles ..
.""' If the Court ever intended to
use Edelman as a vehicle for a drastic ideological enhancement of the place of
state governments in our federal system, it has clearly missed its chance.
E. Section 5 of Amendment XIV-Meeting Place
of Amendments X and XI
Although the case law needs little particularized elaboration at this point,232
the Court's recent treatment of the enforcement provisions of section 5.33 of the
fourteenth amendment must be considered the most significant tile in the crossdoctrinal mosaic of "state sovereignty." Affecting both the tenth and eleventh
amendments, these cases certainly confirm the absence of any massive ideological
shift by the Court toward the enhancement of state government in our constitutional distribution of power.
Certainly, the most drastic limitation on the potential scope of Edelman
occurred in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer234 which decided the relationship between the
eleventh amendment and the enforcement provisions of the fourteenth amendment." 5 The Court's conclusion, "that the eleventh amendment and the principle of state sovereignty which it embodies . . . are necessarily limited by the
enforcement provisions of § 5 of the fourteenth amendment,"2 6 drove a wedge
230 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
231 Id. at 289. Adherence to "traditional eleventh amendment principles" . . . caused the
Court to hold, in Nevada v. Hall, 74 U.S.L.W. 4261 (1979), that "the amendment did not bar
suit against a state by a citizen of another state in the courts of his state." Justice Rehnquist
claimed that such a rule "[m]akes nonsense of the effort embodied in the eleventh amendment
to preserve the doctrine of sovereign immunity." Similarly, in Lake Country Estates, Inc. v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 47 U.S.L.W. 4256 (1979), the Court, again following traditional eleventh amendment principles, refused to apply the amendment to an interstate compact
"comparable to a county or municipality." Id. at 4259.
232 Commentary in this area has been prolific. See e.g., Supreme Court Report, 62 A.B.A. J.
1483, 1486 (1976); The Second Circuit Review, 1974-75 Term, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 822
(1976); Note, Constitutional Law - Availability of Monetary Damage Awards Against the
States, 51 TUL. L. REV. 736 (1977).
233 Amendment XIV, § 5 reads as follows: "The Congress shall have the power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
234 427 U.S. 445 (1976). This case began as a class action under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970 ed. and Supp. IV)
alleging inter alia, that certain provisions of the State's statutory retirement benefit plan discriminated against males because of their sex. The district court found for the plaintiffs and
entered prospective injunctive relief against the defendant state officials. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
390 F. Supp. 278, 285-88 (D. Conn. 1974). Relying on Edelman, it denied retroactive relief
and "reasonable attorney's fees as part of the costs" despite the existence of statutory authority
for both in Title VII. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 706(g) as amended, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(g) (1970) ed. Supp. IV). See also the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(k), 42 U.S.C.
§ 200Oe-5(k) (1970 ed. Supp. 10). The earlier provision is set out in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. at 450 n.5. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's grant of
prospective relief and also agreed that a back pay award was not a "constitutionally permissible method of enforcing fourteenth amendment rights." 519 F.2d at 569. It reversed the
district court on the attorney's fees issue, however, since it felt such an award would only have
an "ancillary effect" on the state treasury. Id. at 571. See 415 U.S. at 667-68. Both parties
petitioned the Supreme Court which granted both petitions, 423 U.S. 1031 (1975), and held
that both retroactive payments and attorneys' fees could be awarded pursuant to the statutory
authority granted in Title VII.
235 See notes 3 and 233 supra.
236 427 U.S. at 456.
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into the immunity barrier erected by Edelman. It affirmed the ability of Congress, when acting pursuant to that authority, to provide for private suits against
states or state officials which are "constitutionally impermissible in other con'
texts."237
The practical significance of Fitzpatrick was significantly expanded by the
Court's decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services."' In Fitzpatrick,
the Court had assumed that its decision made neither states nor municipalities
subject to suit under 42 USC 1983... since, in Monroe v. Pape,4 ° the Court had
previously concluded, on the basis of the legislative history of § 1983, that municipalities were not within the ambit of the statute. "[T]hat being the case," concluded the Fitzpatrick Court, "it could not have been intended to include states
as parties defendant." 24 ' Monell, however, overruled 2 ' Monroe v. Pape4. and,
since Fitzpatrick'sassumption of state immunity under § 1983 rested squarely on
Monroe,'44 the question was posed as to whether the demise of municipal immunity under § 1983 portends liability for states as well. To Justice Brennan,
concurring in Hutto, 4' an affirmative reply was to be soon forthcoming."'
This question of whether § 1983 abrogates the states' eleventh amendment
immunity was forcefully answered by the Court's recent opinion in Quern v.
Jordan.4 ' Actually, the main issue before the Court in that case was whether a
lower federal court could, consistent with the eleventh amendment, order state
officials to apprise welfare recipients of their right to a determination, by the
state, of entitlement to certain benefits already found to have been illegally withheld.' 48 Before curtly deciding that issue in the affirmative the Court, in a single
paragraph, held simply that "this relief falls on the Ex parte Young side of the
eleventh amendment line rather than on the Edelman side"'4 9 and "involves
little, if any, unbroken ground.""' The Court made it clear "that neither the
reasoning of Moneil
sequent to Edelman .

. .
. .

." nor that of the "eleventh amendment cases subjustifies a conclusion different from that which [was]

reached in Edelman.""' Accordingly, it is now established that Monell does not
237 Id. at 456 n.1 1. The Court noted that there was no claim that the substantive provision
of Title VII did not constitute a proper exercise of authority under § 5 of the fourteenth
amendment.

238
239

436 U.S. 658 (1978).

42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
240 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
241 427 U.S. at 452.
242 436 U.S. at 701.
243 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
244 Id.
245 437 U.S. at 700.
246 437 U.S. at 703.
247 47 U.S.L.W. 4241 (1979).
248 This issue was decided in the litigation culminating in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1973).
249 47 U.S.L.W. at 4245.
250 Id. at 4241.
251 Id. at 4243.
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presage the demise of state immunity under § 1983 and, more significantly,
stands as a "reaffirmance of Edelman!"25 2
The vitality of § 5 of amendment fourteen as a brake on the concept of
"state sovereignty" has also been manifested in tenth amendment analysis. In
Milliken v. Bradley,253 the defendants argued that the relief ordered by the District Court violated "the tenth amendment" and "general principles of federalism." '54 The Court's answer was short.
The Tenth Amendment's reservation of nondelegated powers to the States is
not implicated by a federal court judgment enforcing the express prohibitions of unlawful state conduct enacted by the Fourteenth Amendment....
Nor are principles of federalism abrogated by the decree. The District
Court has neither attempted to restructure local government entities nor to
mandate a particular method or structure of state or local financing ...
The District Court has, rather, properly enforced the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment consistent with our prior holdings, and in a manner
that does not jeopardize
the integrity of the structure or functions of state
2 55
and local government.
The tenth amendment is, therefore, no more a barrier than the eleventh to a
cause of action based on the enforcement provision of the fourteenth amendment.
Just as significantly, the tremors of National League of Cities made no impact
on the power of a federal court to fashion a remedial decree in such a case.
Although the Court did not specify the "prior holdings" to which it alluded,
the reference would appear to be to such cases as Swan v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,"6 Pasadena City Board of Education v.Spangler7sT
and Milliken v. Bradley 1.211 In short, the scope of the remedy is determined by
the nature and extent of the constitutional violation. It must be designed "to
restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position they would have
occupied in the absence of such conduct."25 However, in so doing, the federal
court "must take into account the interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs, consistent with the Constitution."26 Within these broad
guidelines, the federal courts remain free to frame the necessary relief. There
have been26 ' and, no doubt, will be occasions when the particular application of
these maxims will raise significant questions as to whether the ideological impact
of National League of Cities is indeed being felt in the shaping of remedies for
violations of rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment through its enforcement provisions. There is, indeed, ample room for a given Justice to inform
each of these standards with his own ideological inclination. In terms of doctrinal
standards, however, the controlling principles antedate the "conventional wisdom's" state sovereignty revolution. 2
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261

Id. at 4244.
433 U.S. 267 (1977).
Id. at 291.
Id.
402 U.S. 1 (1971).
427 U.S. 425 (1976).
418 U.S. 717 (1974).
402 U.S. at 16.
433 U.S. at 281.
See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. at 781 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

262 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education II, 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955).
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Conclusion
An effort to discern, in a cross-doctrinal context, the direction of major
ideological vectors in constitutional development is not a precise science. Indeed,
at times, the line between speculation and prediction is extraordinarily delicate.
In one sense, the problem is especially prevalent when, as here, many of the
Court's utterances have been laconic or highly tentative. From another perspective, however, the lack of aggressive doctrinal development on the part of the
Court provides the most significant clue to its current perspective and direction.
Today's Supreme Court is more consciously aware of federalism and more
perceptibly concerned with preserving the identity of the state government as a
separate, functional entity. It has not, however, gone beyond the tentative
gropings of National League of Cities in defining precisely the attributes of that
separate identity. The text of the Constitution provides marginal assistance in
such a task. The tenth amendment. 6 essentially defines the attributes of state
government in the negative. Consequently, any attempt to frame a description
of the characteristics of "state sovereignty" in the abstract necessarily risks the
premature limitation of the scope of enumerated federal powers-a decidedly
unhappy prospect for a Court which, over the past four decades, has seen the
necessity, time and time again, to expand rather than contract its definition of
various federal powers in order to meet hitherto unforeseen situations such as an
integrated national economy or ecological and environmental concerns. It was
perhaps this quandary which caused Justice Blackmun to temper his joining of
the majority in National League of Cities with the assertion that its holding was
based on a "balancing test"2 4 which would permit the Court always to assessand perhaps to define-the importance of the federal interest before defining the
limits of state "immunity" from that power. The attractiveness of this "balancing approach" as an alternative to the rigid definition of the attributes of state
autonomy has found, apparently, a favorable, although perhaps unconscious, reception in the recent analyses of other members of the National Leagus of Cities
majority. The position of the Chief Justice in City of Lafayette"-especially
when compared with that of the dissenters'--certainly displays signs of a
"balancing approach" in defining the limits of state autonomy when faced with
an important exercise of the Federal Commerce Power. Similarly, the acceptance
of the Euansville test.67 by Justices Powell and Stewart in Massachusettsv. United
States.68 may also evidence a tendency toward adherence of the Blackmun "balancing" approach.
"Balancing approaches" can indeed be convenient "holding patterns" while
a Court engages in institutional reflection over its initial foray into a new doctrinal area before striking out definitively on that new heading. At some point,
however, the comfort of such a "holding pattern" can cause the Court to adopt
it, at least implicitly, as its permanent position. The possibility of that develop263
264
265
266
267
268

See note 1 supra.
426 U.S. at 856.
435 U.S. at 418.
Justices Stewart, White, Rehnquist, and Blackmun.
See text accompanying note 190 supra.
435 U.S. 444 (1978).
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ment in today's ideologically divided but intensely pragmatic Court is certainly
significant. Indeed, this propensity toward a pragmatic approach is already
apparent in the Court's treatment of those aspects of state sovereignty rooted in
eleventh amendment analysis. The Court's treatment of the trial court's attorneys' fees award in Hutto and the costs of the remedial programs in Milliken,
in addition to indicating a desire to preserve necessary tools for the federal courts,
also exhibit an intensely pragmatic -approach toward defining the proper limits
of state autonomy. Certainly, the emerging trend toward resolution of the
problem of conflicting determinations of domicile by federal interpleader also
manifests a predilection to resolve disputes inherent in the federal nature of our
constitutional plan with more of an eye toward pragmatic resolution than
doctrinal purity.
The one definitive decision which the Court has made with regard to the
future of state sovereignty is also its most significant. It is now clear that, however important the Court may view the theoretical autonomy of state governments, it does not intend to promote that value at the expense of the federal
government's capacity to vindicate individual civil liberties protected by the
Federal Constitution. The vitality of the enforcement provisions of the fourteenth
amendment, when weighed directly against the concerns of state autonomy, have
been consciously reaffirmed by the Court.
The passage of time-and the concomitant accumulation of case lawwill, of course, permit those who write on the tenth, fifteenth, or twentieth anniversaries of Edelman and National League of Cities to assess, with far more
accuracy, the overall impact of these decisions on American federalism. At this
point, however, the Court seems content to have simply revitalized the concept
of state sovereignty as an important but not controlling element in the complex
calculus of constitutional adjudication.

